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CASE DIGEST

This CASE DIGEST provides brief analyses of cases that represent current aspects of transnational law. The Digest includes cases that establish legal principles and cases that apply recently established legal principles to new and different factual situations. The Cases are grouped in
topical categories, and references are given for further research.
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IMMIGRATION

NEITHER PRIVATE REFUGEE ASSISTANCE AGENCY NOR ITS MEMBERS
HAVE STANDING TO CONTEST U.S. INTERDICTION OF FOREIGN VES-

HaitianRefugee Center v. Gracey, No. 85-5258, slip op. (D.C. Cir. Jan. 9, 1987).
SELS ON HIGH SEAS CARRYING UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS.

The Haitian Refugee Center (HRC) and two of its members brought
suit to challenge the United States program of interdicting vessels on the
high seas that carried undocumented aliens bound for the United States.
The President had authorized the program in September 1981 in order

to prevent illegal immigration to the United States by sea. Proclamation
No. 4865, 46 Fed. Reg. 48107, reprinted in 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182 app. at
88 (West Supp. 1986); Exec. Order No. 12,324, 46 Fed. Reg. 48109,
reprintedin 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182 app. at 88 (West Supp. 1986). For this
purpose, the United States and Haiti had entered into a treaty that permitted United States authorities to board Haitian flag vessels outside

U.S. territorial waters and make inquiries. If a violation of United States
or Haitian law was discovered, the vessel and its passengers were subject
to return to Haiti. However, no Haitian migrant who qualified for refugee status was to be returned. Agreement on Interdiction of Illegal Mi-
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grants, Sept. 23, 1981, United States-Haiti, T.I.A.S. No. 10241.
In their action for declaratory and injunctive relief, plaintiffs alleged
that the interdiction program: (1) violated the rights of the Haitians
under the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102, and
the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982); (2)
violated the Due Process Clause; (3) failed to satisfy the nonrefoulement
obligation established by the United Nations Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees; and (4) violated the extradition treaty between the
United States and Haiti as well as the federal extradition statute. The
government defendants moved to dismiss on several grounds, including
lack of standing, non-justiciability under the political question doctrine,
and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia held that the plaintiffs had
standing, but that they failed to state a claim. It granted defendants'
motion to dismiss noting the court's limited scope of review in immigration matters. Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey, 600 F. Supp. 1396
(D.D.C. 1985).
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the dismissal on other grounds. Judge Bork, with Judge
Buckley concurring, held that (1) all petitioners lacked standing under

the Supreme Court's prudential principles, and (2) the individual members lacked article III standing for not alleging a specific substantive injury. In applying recent standing decisions, Judge Bork concluded that
HRC alleged sufficient injury for article III standing purposes. However, Judge Buckley's separate concurring opinion expressed a slightly
different analysis of the article III standing causation requirement for
the HRC. Judge Edwards, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
agreed with the dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted, but in his view the majority had adopted an unprecedented test in order to "avoid an obvious showing of standing." Significance - This decision offers an exhaustive review and analysis of the
Supreme Court's recent standing jurisprudence. The court relies on the
doctrine of standing to avoid a decision on the merits which would raise
significant separation of powers concerns, particularly in an area of
transnational law such as immigration law.
ALIEN MUST SHOW ONLY A SUBJECTIVE WELL-FOUNDED FEAR OF
PERSECUTION, NOT AN OBJECTIVE CLEAR PROBABILITY OF PERSECUTION WHEN SEEKING REFUGEE STATUS AND POSSIBLE DISCRETION-

ARY GRANT OF ASYLUM FROM ATTORNEY GENERAL.

INS v. Cardoza-
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Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207 (1987).
In response to an Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) deportation proceeding, Luz Marina Cardoza-Fonseca, a Nicaraguan citizen who illegally entered the U.S. in 1979, requested suspension of deportation proceedings under § 243(h) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982), and eligibility for
refugee status and asylum under § 208(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. §
1158(a) (1982). She claimed that if returned to her native Nicaragua: (1)
it was more likely than not that her life or freedom would be threatened
and thus by § 243(h) deportation should be suspended; and (2) she had a
well-founded fear of persecution and thus by § 208(a) qualified as a
refugee worthy of asylum consideration. She supported both claims with
evidence that if returned to Nicaragua she might face a similar treatment
as her brother, a political dissident who was imprisoned and tortured by
the Sandanistas. The Immigration Judge (IJ) applied the dear
probability of persecution standard of § 243(h) to both claims and concluded that the evidence supported neither claim. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed stating that she had "failed to establish
that she would suffer persecution within the meaning of 208(a) or
243(h) of the [INA]." On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Cardoza-Fonseca
argued that both the IJ and the BIA erroneously applied the clear
probability standard of § 243(h) to her § 208(a) claim. The Ninth Circuit agreed with Cardoza-Fonseca. 767 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1985).
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed holding that
under § 208(a) of the INA an alien need only show a well-founded fear
of persecution upon deportation to qualify as a refugee worthy of asylum
consideration. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, based this distinction on a plain reading of the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96212, 94 Stat. 102, which amended the INA, and its legislative history.
Section 208(a) gives the Attorney General discretion to grant asylum to
an alien who qualifies as a "refugee" which is defined as a person who
has at least a "well-founded fear of persecution" if returned to his or her
home country. Justice Stevens stated that § 208(a)'s reference to fear
"obviously makes the eligibility determination turn to some extent on the
subjective mental state of the alien... [while the] 'would be threatened'
language of § 243(h) has no subjective component, but instead required
the alien to establish by objective evidence that it is more likely than not
that he or she will be subject to persecution upon deportation." Also, at
the time Congress passed the Refugee Act it did not amend the § 243(h)
clear probability of persecution standard and did not incorporate the
terms refugee or well-founded fear into § 243(h). Significance - Because eligibility for asylum now hinges on the more generous subjective,
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well-founded fear standard, the Attorney General may evaluate the
needs of a broader category of political and religious dissidents and detainees. In addition, U.S. procedures for dealing with refugees now conform with the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, which the U.S. has
signed.
SEPARATION OF CITIZEN CHILDREN FROM ILLEGAL ALIEN PARENTS
SHOULD BE CONSIDERED WHEN DETERMINING EXTREME HARDSHIP

PROCEEDINGS-Cerillo-Perezv. INS, 55 U.S.L.W.
2457 (9th Cir. 1987).
IN DEPORTATION

Petitioners entered the United States from Mexico in 1975 without
inspection. Between 1975 and 1982, the petitioners had three children,
built up $22,000 of equity in their home, and established friendships and
ties with United States citizens. In 1982, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) issued orders to show cause, alleging that the petitioners were deportable because they had entered the United States without inspection. The petitioners conceded deportability but argued that
deportation should be suspended because it would result in extreme
hardship to themselves and their children. Both the immigration judge
and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) held that, while all other
requirements for suspension were satisfied, petitioners did not show extreme hardship. Although the BIA can construe "extreme hardship"
narrowly, it must state its reasons and show proper consideration of all
factors when denying relief. Courts have held that hardship to spouses,
parents, and children should be considered, not simply the hardship to
the illegal alien. The petitioners contended that the BIA erred by failing
to consider the hardship posed by the separation of parent from child,
since the children, as citizens, were free to remain in the United States.
The Ninth Circuit agreed. Although the INS argued that a parent
would not leave tender aged children alone in another country, the court
recognized that there were compelling reasons for the petitioners to do
so; namely, the educational advantages of growing up in the United
States rather than Mexico, and the fact that the United States is a safe
haven from persecution. In addition, the petitioners had strong community ties which would make it possible for them to leave their children in
the care of another. While the court conceded that separation is not per
se hardship, it held that BIA must consider this factor when making
deportation decisions. Significance - This decision aligned the Ninth
Circuit with the Fifth Circuit, Ramos v. INS, 695 F.2d 181 (5th Cir.
1983), in holding that the BIA must consider separation of citizen children from illegal alien parents as a possibly crucial factor in determining
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extreme hardship which might arise from deportation. Henceforth, the
BIA may not assume that school-aged citizen children will automatically
accompany their illegal alien parents if deported.
II.

PERSONAL JURISDICTION

CALIFORNIA STATE COURT'S EXERCISE OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
OVER JAPANESE MANUFACTURER

TO INDEMNIFY TAIWANESE COM-

PANY IS UNREASONABLE AND UNFAIR IN VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS.

Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 107 S. Ct.
1026 (1987).
Gary Zurcher, injured in a motorcycle accident in California, commenced a products liability action against Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial
Co. (Cheng Shin), a Taiwanese tire manufacturer, in a California state
court alleging it produced faulty tires. In the same action Cheng Shin
filed a cross-complaint against Asahi Metal Industry Co. (Asahi) for indemnification alleging that Asahi's defective tire valve assembly caused
the accident. Asahi manufactured tire value assemblies in Japan and sold
substantial numbers to Chen Shin. The motorcyclist's settlement with
Cheng Shin led to a dismissal of the original suit, but Cheng Shin's
indemnification claim against Asahi remained. Asahi moved to quash
summons arguing California's long-arm statute violated the Due Process
Clause. The California Supreme Court held the statute did not violate
due process and that Asahi was subject to personal jurisdiction in California because it purposefully availed itself of the benefits of California's
laws by placing the valve assemblies in the stream of commerce knowing
they would end up in California. 39 Cal. 3d 35, 702 P.2d 543 (1985).
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed and remanded.
The Court, except for Justice Scalia, agreed that under the circumstances of this case, California's assertion of personal jurisdiction was
unreasonable and unfair. In reaching this decision, the Court considered
several factors. First, Asahi would bear a heavy burden in traversing
great distances and defending itself in California's foreign legal system.
Second, the plaintiff Cheng Shin and the State of California had only a
slight interest in resolving the dispute in California, since neither Cheng
Shin and Asahi are California corporations. Finally, the procedural and
substantive policies of other nations whose interests are affected, i.e. Japan and Korea, as well as the federal interest in its foreign relations
policies strongly suggested limiting California's assertion of personal jurisdiction in the international arena.
The Court, however, split 4-4 on whether merely placing a product in
the stream of commerce satisfied "minimum contacts" to subject a corpo-
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ration in a foreign state to personal jurisdiction. Justice O'Conner
(joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Powell and Justice Scalia)
wrote that to establish necessary minimum contacts, a defendant must
purposefully direct its actions toward the forum state; merely placing
goods in the stream of commerce, even with an awareness that some of
its goods will end up in the foreign state, was not enough in Asahi's case.
Some additional conduct is necessary. Justice Brennan (joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun) concluded that Asahi had established minimum contacts with the forum state by placing its tire valve
assemblies in the stream of commerce. Asahi was aware that the product
would be marketed in the state and could have reasonably anticipated
being hailed into court there. Justice Stevens could have resolved the
constitutionality of the stream of commerce theory in this case, but declined to address the issue. Significance - The Supreme Court has restricted the reach of state long-arm statutes over foreign defendants based
on considerations of fairness and reasonableness without reaching agreement on a minimum contacts standard. The scope of the stream of commerce theory as set-out in World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286 (1980), remains unresolved.

III.

TAXATION

NONDISCRIMINATORY AD VALOREM STATE PROPERTY TAX ON IMPORTED GOODS HELD IN CUSTOM-BONDED WAREHOUSES
FOR DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION IS CONSTITUTIONAL.

INTENDED

R.J. Reynolds Co.

v. Durham County, N.C., 107 S.Ct. 499 (1986).
R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company (Reynolds), a New Jersey manufacturer of tobacco products, imported foreign tobacco for blending with
domestic tobacco and eventual consumption within the United States.
Reynolds stored the imported tobacco for aging in custom-bonded warehouses located in Forsyth and Durham Counties, North Carolina. During the aging period, North Carolina accessed an ad valorem property
tax on the imported tobacco. Relying on Xerox Corp. v. County of Harris, 459 U.S. 145 (1982), Reynolds claimed the imported tobacco was
immune from taxation and that the state tax violated the Supremacy
Clause, the Import-Export Clause, and the Due Process Clause. The
North Carolina tax supervisors and the county and State Board of
Equalization and Review denied Reynolds' claim that its imported tobacco was immune from state taxation on constitutional grounds. The
North Carolina Court of Appeals and later the North Carolina Supreme
Court affirmed the lower rulings.
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court held the state tax constitutional
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because (1) the tax does not act as an "Impost or Duty" by interfering
with the federal government's regulation of commercial relations with
foreign governments, by depriving the federal government of revenues, or
by disturbing the harmony among the States through unequal State taxation at the seaboard and thus does not violate the Import-Export
Clause; (2) the tax bears a fiscal relation to state protection, opportunities and benefits, i.e. police and fire protection, and thus does not violate
the Due Process Clause; and (3) the tax does not interfere with federal
custom duty regulations and thus is not preempted. The Court narrowed
the Xerox holding to exempting from state tax only those imported goods
stored in a U.S. customs-bonded warehouse destined for foreign markets,
not the U.S. domestic market. Significance - This decision distinguishes
imported goods held in customs-bonded warehouses intended for domestic manufacturers and consumption from those held for reexport in the
stream of foreign commerce. States may assess property taxes on imported goods intended for domestic sale which allows equal treatment of
both imported and domestic goods sold in the U.S. without affecting
those goods traveling in the stream of foreign commerce.
PANAMA CANAL TREATY EXEMPTS U.S. CITIzENs EMPLOYED BY THE
PANAMA CANAL COMMISSION FROM PANAMANIAN TAXATION BUT

NOT U.S. TAXATION.

O'Connor v. U.S., 107 S. Ct. 347 (1986).

Petitioners, Panama Canal Commission employees, sought refunds of
U.S. taxes paid on salaries paid by the Commission between 1979 and
1981. They contended that a provision of the Panama Canal Treaty,
Panama Canal Treaty: Implementation of Articles III, Sept. 7, 1977,
U.S.-Panama, § 2, T.I.A.S. No. 1031, exempts Commission salaries for
U.S. citizens from both U.S. and Panamanian taxation. The Claims
Court agreed, 6 Cl. Ct. 115 (1984); however, the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit reversed and held that the treaty exempts U.S. citizens working for the Commission from paying Panamanian taxes only.
761 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
On grant of certiorori, a unanimous Supreme Court affirmed the court
of appeal's reading of the treaty. Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia
stated art. XV, section 2, which exempts the Commission "from payment
in the Republic of Panama of all taxes," when read in context with the
entire article must be consistent with section 1, which is limited to Panamanian taxes. If the article operated as the petitioners claimed, then
Commission employees would be exempt from all U.S. taxation on any
income including gifts, inheritances, and investments within the United
States. Justice Scalia found this was an implausible result contrary to the
executive branch's historical application of the treaty. Significance -
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The Supreme Court resolved conflicting interpretations of the treaty
which had arisen in the lower courts. The Court did so without relying
on the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, which directs that the
treaty not be construed to exempt any U.S. citizens from U.S. taxation.

Thus, the Court avoided confronting the constitutionality of a retroactive
income tax.
IV.

FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES

ACT

FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT DoES NOT OPERATE RETROACTIVELY To CONFER SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER PEO-

PLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA DEFAULT ON GOVERNMENT BONDS ISSUED

1911. Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490 (11th
Cir. 1986).

IN

United States citizens who purchased bearer bonds issued by the Imperial Government of China in 1911, filed a class action in U.S. district
court demanding payment from the present government - the People's
Republic of China (PRC). The PRC failed to respond, and the district
court entered a default judgment in excess of 41 million dollars. 550 F.
Supp. 869 (N.D. Ala. 1982). Following high level diplomatic negotiations, the PRC entered the suit seeking dismissal based on absolute sovereign immunity. The district court set aside the default judgment and
dismissed holding that the FSIA did not apply retroactively to confer
jurisdiction over the 1911 sale of bearer bonds and the subsequent payment default in 1951. 596 F. Supp. 386 (N.D. Ala. 1984).
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed and generally agreed with
the district court's interpretation of the FSIA, its legislative history, and
the effect of antecedent rights of China to absolute immunity. In addition, the court of appeals stated this decision was consistent with the
leading case, CorporacionVenezolana de Fomento v. Vintero Sales, 629
F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1980), on FSIA retroactivity. In dicta, the court of
appeals suggested that jurisdiction might have existed if plaintiffs had
contended that the renegotiation of the bonds in 1937 caused the subsequent default to occur in 1976. This could be possible because of the
FSIA's retroactive effect back to 1952 when the U.S. adopted restrictive
immunity through the Tate Letter. Significance - This decision holds
that the FSIA does not confer retroactive subject matter jurisdiction to
the claims and facts of this case. But, because at least six other cases are
pending in federal courts which assert liability for acts of foreign sovereigns committed before 1952, FSIA retroactivity remains an open question ripe for Supreme Court review.
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V. ACT

OF STATE

ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE DOES NOT BAR TEXAS DEPOSITOR'S ALLEGATION THAT MEXICAN BANK AND ITS AGENTS NEGLIGENTLY MISREPRESENTED THE SECURITY

OF MEXICAN INVESTMENTS.

Grass v.

Credito Mexicano, S.A., 797 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1986).
Adrian Grass, who had deposited U.S. dollars over a six year period
in Credito Mexicano, S.A., a bank in Mexico, filed suit after the bank
paid back the principal and interest in pesos at the official exchange rate,
rather than in U.S. dollars as the parties had earlier agreed. The district
court dismissed all claims holding that the act of state doctrine barred
consideration by a U.S. court.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the act of
state doctrine barred six of Grass's seven claims; however, the negligent
misrepresentation claim survived this stage of the litigation. Based on the
pleadings, the alleged misrepresentations involved commercial activity of
Credito Mexicano's agent within the U.S. without directly implicating
an act of state - a subsequent Mexican currency control regulation
which requires payment of deposits in pesos at the official rate. Relying
on Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985), the court
warned that if further adjudication involved reviewing the validity of the
exchange control regulations, the act of state doctrine would bar this
claim as well. Significance - The 5th Circuit applied the act of state
doctrine analysis developed in Callejo v. Bancomer to the claim of negligent misrepresentation and held that this complaint on its face does not
directly implicate the validity of the Mexican currency control regulations and thus the act of state doctrine does not apply.
VI.

EXTRADITION

NARROW SCOPE OF HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW OF A MAGISTRATE'S
EXTRADITION

ORDER APPLIES TO REVIEW

PROVISIONAL DETENTION HEARING. In

OF PRE-EXTRADITION

the Matter of the Extradition

of Russell, 805 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1986).
A United States citizen was confined after a probable cause hearing
before a federal magistrate concerning an arrest warrant sought by a
U.S. Attorney on behalf of the government of Colombia. The underlying
charges arose out of a transaction in which 13 million dollars was transferred out of a Columbian government account at the Chase Manhattan
Bank in London which allegedly violated the Columbia Penal Code. The
U.S. citizen was confined pursuant to the provisional arrest clause in
article 11 of the Extradition Treaty between the U.S. and the Republic
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of Colombia; however, a formal extradition hearing had not yet been
held.
On review, the district court adopted the narrow standard used to review extraditability issues and found that a reasonable basis existed for
the magistrate's probable cause determination. 647 F. Supp. 1044. The
court reviewed only (1) whether the magistrate had jurisdiction, (2)
whether the offense charged was within the treaty; and (3) whether
there were reasonable grounds for the magistrate's findings ordering no
bail and ordering provisional detention under article 11 of the treaty. On
appeal, the 5th Circuit affirmed the district court and without discussion
approved the district court's adoption of the narrow standard of review
for the provisional detention hearing. Significance - This decision
adopted the traditional limited scope of habeas review used to review the
formal extradition hearing to a preliminary provisional detention hearing. See also Comment, Scope of Review in Extradition Proceedings:
The Government Cannot Appeal the Denial of Extradition Request
Based on the DeclaratoryJudgment Act - U.S. v. Doherty, 19 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 893 (1987).

